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Ronald Rex Ivie, by and through his counsel of record, David J. 
Holdsworth, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24, submits the following Opening Brief 
in this appeal. 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err when it decided that Sen. 
Hickman and Rep. Urquhart (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the 
Legislative Defendants") were absolutely immune from suit for the claims Mr. 
Ivie was asserting and when it dismissed Mr. Ivie's Verified Complaint as 
against the Legislative Defendants on the merits and with prejudice? 
(A) Applicable Standard of Appellate Review (with 
supporting authority): De novo. In reviewing a trial court's decision to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the appellate court accepts the factual 
allegations in the Complaint as true, reviews the facts and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party and gives the trial court's decision as to matters of law 
no deference, reviewing for correctness. Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128 
1 
(Utah 2002), Krause v. Bower. 2001 UT 28, Tfl2, 20 P.3d 895 (2001), 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). A 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted only if it 
appears to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief 
under any state of facts which could be proven in support of the claim. 
Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 243 P.2d 441 (Utah 1952). The 
existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court. Russell v. 
Thomson Newspapers. Inc.. 842 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1992). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Plaintiffs 
filing of his memorandum in opposition to the Legislative Defendants5 
motion to dismiss. Record at 89-102 (hereinafter referred to as "R at 
ff 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution and Article XVI, Sections 3 and 7 of the Utah Constitution. Some of 
the cases which may be determinative include: Riddle v. Perry. 40 P.3d 1128 (Utah 
2002) and federal cases interpreting speech or debate clause immunity in the U.S. 
2 
Constitution such as Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 
(1975), and Forrester v. White. 494 U.S. 219 (1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. This appeal is from a final order of 
the Third District Court. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW . Mr. Ivie filed the 
instant action against various Defendants in Third District Court, alleging a violation 
of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, § 67-21-1, et. seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, a violation of the 14 th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a violation of 
the State Constitution and a violation of Utah Department of Human Resources 
Management ("DHRM") rules and procedures. R. at 1-15. In the course of the 
litigation, Mr. Ivie settled his claims as against all Defendants except Sen. Hickman 
and Rep. Urquhart. R. at 131-132. The Legislative Defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that Mr. Ivie's claims against the Legislative Defendants in the instant 
case were barred by principles of legislative immunity and on other principles. R. at 
83-85 and R. at 48-82. In October 2003, the Third District Court granted the 
Legislative Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed such claims against such 
Legislative Defendants with prejudice. R. at 114-120 and 121-122. Shortly thereafter, 
Mr. Ivie's settlement with the other Defendants was finalized and in December 2003, 
3 
the Court dismissed Mr. Ivie's claims against all other Defendants, thus, creating a 
final order. R. 131-137. This appeal followed. R. 141-143. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
The Utah Department of Health employed Mr. Ivie as a general sanitation 
and safety manager for thirteen years. Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart are duly 
elected legislators of the Utah Legislature. R. 2, 3, 49. 
In May/June 2001, Mr. Ivie's supervisor, Richard Clark ("Clark"), 
assigned Mr. Ivie a project to conduct training exercises with the staff of the local 
health departments in Cedar City and St. George, Utah, on State rules regarding public 
pool sanitation and safety and to assess the compliance of the public pools in that 
geographic region with State sanitation and safety standards. R. at 3. 
On June 7, 2001, Mr. Ivie submitted a written memorandum to Clark 
summarizing his performance of the assignment. He further provided his assessment 
that the health departments in Cedar City and St. George, Utah were not enforcing 
State Administrative Code Rule R392-302 "Design, Construction and Operation of 
Public Pools" and were, therefore, allowing members of the public swimming in public 
pools to be exposed to potentially serious or life threatening health hazards. R. at 3, 4, 
49. 
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Subsequently, a constituent of Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart 
complained to such legislators that her swimming pool should not be required to 
comply with the requirements of the State rules regulating public swimming pools. 
Thereafter, Hickman and Urquhart contacted Mr. Ivie's supervisor. Subsequently, 
Hickman and Urquhart contacted Mr. Ivie. R. 4, 11. 
Mr. Ivie spoke with Legislators Hickman and Urquhart about the 
requirements of the State rules and why they were necessary. R. at 4. Hickman and 
Urquhart insisted that Mr. Ivie exempt pools operated by retirement communities in the 
St. George area, from portions of the State rules. R. at 4. Mr. Ivie informed them that 
there was no permissive language in the Rule to allow him to do that and that he 
needed to enforce the law as it had been written. R. at 4. Both Hickman and Urquhart 
told Mr. Ivie that if he did not comply with their wishes, they would deal with the issue 
in their own way. R. at 4. Mr. Ivie assumed that what they meant was introducing 
legislation to allow the Department to grant exemptions, where appropriate to the State 
rules. However, what Hickman and Urquhart meant, unbeknownst to Mr. Ivie, was not 
to introduce legislation, but rather to eliminate funding for Mr. Ivie's job and to cost 
him his employment with the State. 
Subsequently, the Joint Executive Appropriations Committee of the Utah 
Legislature, of which Hickman was a Vice-Chairman, held a committee meeting. Rep. 
5 
Urquhart was not present. At that meeting, it was moved to reduce the Department of 
Health's budget by $115,700. The Committee voted and passed the motion, with all 
but one of the eighteen members present voting in favor of the motion. R. at 50-51. 
The reduction in funding to the Department of Health, recommended by 
the Executive Appropriations Committee, was sponsored by Senator Leonard 
Blackham as Senate Bill 1, (S.B.I), The Appropriations Act. On March 5, 2002, both 
houses of the Utah State Legislature S.B.I passed. On March 26, 2002, Governor 
Michael O. Leavitt signed S.B.I into law. R. at 51. 
The reduction in funds required the Department of Health to eliminate 
two full time positions. The budget bill did not specify which jobs needed to be 
eliminated. R. at 5, 51. 
Sometime thereafter, Sen. Hickman made a threat to the Department of 
Health that if Executive Director, Rod Betit, did not implement the budget cuts in such 
a way that the cuts eliminated Mr. Ivie's position (and Mr. Ivie), Sen. Hickman would 
push for future cuts in appropriations to the Department of Health. R. at 5. 
Accordingly, the Executive Director of the Department of Health, Rod Betit, singled 
out Mr. Ivie for termination and on June 25, 2002, the Department of Health notified 
Mr. Ivie that due to the non-appropriation of funds from the Utah State Legislature, the 
6 
Department was terminating his position and terminating his employment. The 
Department did not offer him any retreat rights. R. at 5-6. 
On July 24, 2002, Mr. Ivie submitted an appeal to the Department 
challenging his termination on several grounds, including the fact that he was the 
senior staff member and there were junior staff members that could be terminated 
instead. R. at 6. 
On July 25, 2002, Executive Director Betit prepared and signed a 
workforce adjustment plan which had the purpose and effect of terminating Mr. Ivie's 
employment. R. at 6. 
On October 22, 2002, Mr. Ivie hand delivered a Notice of Claim to the 
Utah Attorney General's office. R. at 8, 13-15. The Utah Attorney General's office 
did not respond within ninety days, therefore, the claim was deemed denied. R. at 9. 
The instant case followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss, the Court 
must take the allegations of Mr. Ivie's Verified Complaint as true. See West v. 
Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999,1003-4 (Utah 1994). Taking the facts set forth 
in Mr. Ivie's Verified Complaint as true, the trial court should have concluded that Mr. 
Ivie's allegations as to the actions of the Legislative Defendants placed such actions 
7 
outside the scope of legislative immunity, and, thus, that Mr. Ivie had stated a 
cognizable and justiciable claim against the Legislative Defendants. The trial court 
erred when it granted the Legislative Defendants5 motion to dismiss with prejudice. 
The trial court should have denied the motion and allowed the case to proceed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS WERE CAPABLE 
OF A READING WHICH PLACES CERTAIN ACTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
DEFENDANTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE 
IMMUNITY /LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY. 
In their motion to dismiss, the Legislative Defendants had argued they 
were immune from suit because of the "Speech or Debate" clause of Article VI, 
Section 8, of the State Constitution, which provides immunity for a legislator's actions 
within the legislative arena.1 (The Legislative Defendants had also argued that all of 
the acts alleged and at issue were acts within the legislative sphere and, thus, fell 
within the scope of speech or debate clause immunity). R. at 52-57. 
The District Court determined that the dispositive issue was whether the 
Legislative Defendants were immune from the claims underlying Plaintiffs lawsuit. 
lrrhe Legislative Defendants had also argued that the Complaint raised an issue which was 
non-justiciable and that Legislative Defendants were immune from liability under common law 
principles of legislative immunity. R. at 57-62. The parties had fully briefed such issues but because 
the trial court found the issue of legislative immunity dispositive, R. at 117, 118, the Court did not 
address the Legislative Defendants' remaining arguments. 
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The District Court found and concluded that the Legislative Defendants' actions were 
within the legislative sphere and, thus, immune from suit and granted the Defendants' 
motion to dismiss. R. at 118. For the reasons set forth below, such a decision was 
erroneous. 
A. Speech or Debate Clause Immunity. 
Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution provides immunity 
to legislators "for words used in any speech or debate in either house." This 
language is modeled after similar language in the U.S. Constitution. The 
judicial branch has historically interpreted the speech and debate clause broadly, 
applying it not just to statements on the floors of the legislative houses but 
statements within committee meetings and other legislative proceedings. See, 
for example, Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 
(1975), Tennevv. Brandhove. 341 U.S. 367, 372-375, 71 S.Ct. 783, 45 L.Ed. 
1019 (1951), Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128, 1131-1132 (Utah 2002). Yet, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has also stated that similar language in the federal 
constitution is exact and, thus, there is no room for a construction which would 
extend the privilege beyond its reasonable terms. See Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 
76, 79 L.Ed 208, 55 S.Ct. 21 (1934) (privilege or immunity of a member of 
Congress from arrest limited to physical restraint or detention of a person, not 
9 
immunity from being served with a summons or a subpoena or from having 
property attached as a means of satisfying a judgment; and publication and 
circulation of allegedly libelous documents by a U.S. Senator outside of the 
Senate could subject the Senator to liability for libel). Thus, the speech and 
debate clause may create an absolute privilege to speak and participate in 
legislative proceedings without liability for defamation (or other torts) but does 
not create absolute immunity for all acts of legislators. See Johnson v. Northside 
Res. Redev. Council. 467 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Ct. App. MN, 1991) (councilman's 
claim of official immunity was an immunity defense similar to qualified 
privilege applicable to claims of defamation committed by a public official. 
Such claims of limited immunity did not extend if improper motives were 
shown). 
Because the speech or debate clauses of the U.S. and Utah 
Constitutions deal most obviously with speech or debate, most of the cases 
involving the delimitation of the scope of the immunity granted by speech or 
debate clauses have arisen in the context of claims for slander or libel against 
Members of Congress and legislators of the states. Although Mr. Ivie is not 
alleging the tort of defamation, but a claim under the state government 
whistleblower protection act, it is useful to examine how courts faced with 
10 
claims of libel against legislators have analyzed the scope of the immunity based 
on the speech or debate clause. The cases involving claims of defamation 
against Congressmen are fairly rare. See McGovern v. Mantz, 182 F.Supp. 343 
(D.C. Dist. Col. 1960) (a Congressman's privilege and immunity under the 
speech or debate clause of the U.S. Constitution did not extend to republication 
of allegedly libelous remarks which the Congressman published in a letter he 
circulated off the floor of the House; the Congressman could have been liable 
for malicious defamation for his unofficial republication and dissemination of 
allegedly libelous remarks). 
The cases involving claims of defamation against state legislators 
seem to be more numerous. Out of such cases has come the following 
test-whether allegedly defamatory actions made by a state legislator are outside 
of speech or debate immunity depends on whether they were made "in the 
exercise of a legislative function." See Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp , 66 
Hawaii 133, 658 P.2d 312 (1983), 38 ALR4 t h 1088, later proceeding, 690 P.2d 
1304 (where it was not shown as a matter of law that the legislator was 
performing a legislative function at the time of the remarks alleged to be 
defamatory but a performing a political chore, summary judgment to the 
legislator was inappropriate). See also Biggans v. Foglietta, 403 Pa. 510, 170 
11 
ALR 2d 345 (1961) (where city councilman's letter to the city manager which 
allegedly libeled the plaintiff was published not on the floor of the city council 
but through a political headquarters, such publication not absolutely privileged, 
summary judgment to the legislator was reversed and remanded). 
Applying this case law which has developed in the libel context as 
to the scope of immunity granted by the speech or debate clause to the instant 
case, the issue is whether the actions Mr. Ivie complained of were within the 
"legitimate legislative sphere." The trial court framed the issue correctly; it just 
answered the question erroneously. Where the trial court erred was in finding 
that the actions of which Mr. Ivie complained were within the "legitimate 
legislative sphere."2 This was erroneous. 
1. Not all of the Legislative Defendants' actions of 
which Mr. Ivie complains were made in speeches or debates or other 
actions during legislative sessions or proceedings. 
The courts may interpret the speech or debate clause 
broadly but they do still apply it to actions bearing some relationship to 
2The trial court found that Plaintiff had not pled sufficient facts to show that Plaintiff had a 
claim against the Legislative Defendants. But the trial court's core finding was that "the acts 
underlying Plaintiffs claims were within the Legislative Defendants['] power as legislators." For the 
reasons set forth below, this interpretation of the scope of speech or debate clause immunity is too 
expansive of an interpretation of speech or debate clause immunity. 
12 
speech or debate. See, generally, Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund. 421 U.S. 491 at 503 (1975). Mr. Ivie was not suing Sen. Hickman 
or Rep. Urquhart for anything they said during any speech or debate in 
either House of the State Legislature or for any actions they orchestrated 
during the budget deliberations occurring during the legislative session at 
issue. He is suing them for actions they took before the legislative 
session: for trying to interfere in his performance of his job, for 
threatening to take adverse action against him if he did not comply with 
their directives, and for the actions they apparently took after the 
legislative session was over to make sure the cuts in funding were 
implemented in such a way that they cost him his job. 
Mr. Ivie concedes that during the legislative session any 
actions the Legislative Defendants took to reallocate priorities and to 
appropriate public funds accordingly are absolutely immune. But before 
the session was underway, when they interfered in the performance of his 
job, and after the session was over, when they retaliated against him by 
threatening to push for further cuts in appropriations to the Department 
of Health if the Executive Director of the Department of Health did not 
specifically implement the budget cuts in such a way as to ensure Mr. 
13 
Ivie's termination, they stepped outside of the scope of legitimate 
legislative action and immunity. They were on their own. Compare 
Adamson v. Bonesteele. 671 P.2d 693, 295 Or 815, 41 ALR 4 th 1103 
(1983) (no statutory law or common law justified extending immunity to 
shield a local legislator's remarks concerning legislative business made 
outside the legislative meeting place and outside the legislative process 
itself). Mr. Ivie had argued that such acts were outside the scope of 
legitimate legislative activity and, thus, outside the shield of the speech 
or debate clause. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary was error. 
The actions of which Mr. Ivie complains all fell outside of 
the scope of the immunity granted by "speech and debate" clause. The 
issue was not the Legislative Defendants' motives; it was whether the 
Legislative Defendants' actions had something to do with speech or 
debate in a legislative proceeding. The actions at issue occurred outside 
of the legislative session and outside the legislative process; they were 
individual acts which Mr. Ivie alleged violated the Utah Protection of 
Public Employees Act, not within the scope of legitimate legislative 
action. Thus, Mr. Ivie's argument that the trial court's expansive 
interpretation of speech or debate clause immunity was erroneous. 
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Compare again the cases involving claims of defamation against 
government officials. Meyer v. McKeown, 266 111. App. 3d 324, 204 111. 
Dec. 593, 596, 641 NE 2d 1212, 1215, app. denied 158 111. 2d 571, 206 
111. Dec. 838, 645 N.E. 2d 1360 (where member of village board of 
trustees sent letter allegedly defaming real estate developer to 1200 
constituents, court erred in dismissing action on basis of privilege where 
legislator's statements were not within scope of member's legislative 
duties). In doing what they did, the Legislative Defendants were not 
engaged in any work on behalf of the Legislature or a legislative 
committee. They were on their own errand and, therefore, outside the 
scope of legislative immunity. Compare Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128 
(Utah 2002) at 1134 (for legislative immunity to apply to witnesses in a 
legislative proceeding, the statement must have some relationship to the 
proceeding). And see Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93, 854 P.2d 126, 
126, 128-130 (even though no legislation was proposed, pending or 
contemplated when councilman's statements made, councilman speaking 
to a legislative body was engaged in legislative function of speaking to a 
legislative body-the specific content of his statement did not make his 
15 
speech an executive function), Accord Hahn v. City of Kenner, 984 
F.Supp. 436 (E.D. La. 1997).3 
"Legislative activity11 is not all encompassing. If legislators 
venture outside of the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, they can 
lose immunity. That is what happened here. Reading the Verified 
Complaint as the trial court should have read it in considering the motion 
to dismiss, the trial court should have concluded that Mr. Ivie's 
allegations were sufficient to place certain actions of the Legislative 
Defendants outside of legitimate legislative activity and the legislative 
sphere so as to withstand a motion to dismiss on grounds of speech or 
debate clause immunity. 
2. The Legislative Defendants' actions fell outside of 
making policy for the entire state. 
As set forth above, state legislative officials may be 
absolutely immune from liability for official conduct within the sphere of 
legitimate legislative activity or authority. 
3See also Restatement of Torts 2d, § 590, a member of a state legislative body is absolutely 
privileged to make defamatory statements concerning another while in the performance of the 
legislative function, that privilege is not limited to conduct on the floor of the legislative body but 
extends to the work of legislative committees or subcommittees that are engaged in any investigation 
or other work authorized by the legislative body, whether that work is performed while that body is in 
session or during a recess. 
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Another test of whether any given act of a legislator is 
inside or outside of the legitimate legislative sphere seems to be not only 
whether the act occurred while the Legislature was in session or during a 
meeting of a legislative committee; but whether the legislator's actions at 
issue were intended to impact only one or two or a few select individuals 
or the general public at large. The latter may be legislative activity, the 
former may not be. See Chateaubriand v. Gaspard, 97 F.3d 1218, 1221 
(9th Cir. 1996) (state legislators who demoted and then fired a public 
employee were not entitled to assert an absolute immunity defense-the 
court considered whether the action involved ad hoc decision making 
which affected only a few persons, as opposed to formulation of general 
policy which affected the public at large) and Yeldell v. Cooper Green 
Hospital 956 F.2d 1056, 1063 (11th Cir. 1992) (decision to introduce 
legislation calling for redistribution of work assignments protected by 
absolute immunity, but decision to fire, demote or suspend specific 
employees were not protected by immunity). This test is functional, it 
focuses on the basic nature of the activity performed, not the identity of 
the actor who performed it. Compare Forrester v. White
 m 494 U.S. 219 
(1988). 
17 
The trial court found that the acts underlying Mr. Ivie's 
claims were within the Legislative Defendants5 power as legislators. 
"Any threats made by the Legislative Defendants were more or less true 
statements of their power as legislators." But after their threats, these 
legislators did not proceed to introduce or pass legislation exempting 
pools at retirement communities from the State rules regulating public 
swimming pools; they engineered the elimination of the job of the one 
executive branch employee responsible for executing the law and 
enforcing the regulations and who refused to bow to their political 
pressure. 
What Mr. Ivie is complaining of is not that Sen. Hickman 
and Rep. Urquhart eventually engineered decisions on the state budget 
that had the effect of necessitating a reduction in force in the Department 
of Health (though not necessarily the selection of Mr. Ivie for the 
reduction in force). He is not complaining that the legislators 
orchestrated the passage of a budget bill which eliminated some funding 
to the Department of Health and, as a result, some positions. He is 
alleging that prior to the session, the two legislators, on their own, 
purported to tell Mr. Ivie what he should be doing in his job and tried to 
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control his actions and then, when he resisted their political pressure, the 
two legislators decided to retaliate against him, not by changing the law, 
but by cutting funds for the program Mr. Ivie administered and the job he 
held. Mr. Ivie is also alleging that, in addition, after the legislative 
session, the two legislators continued to retaliate against Mr. Ivie by 
telling those in the executive branch in a position to implement the 
budget cuts, that they had to implement the budget cuts in such a way as 
to make sure that Mr. Ivie would lose his job. 
The Legislative Defendants' discretionary decisions 
making policy for the whole state, such as setting the budgetary priorities 
for the state, is a core legislative function. Mr. Ivie realizes those actions 
are shielded. But those are not the actions of which Mr. Ivie complains. 
Legitimate legislative action would have been the making 
of policy for the entire state, such as sponsoring legislation exempting 
swimming pools operated by retirement communities from state rules on 
public swimming pools. But dictating to an executive branch employee 
that he should not enforce State rules against the owner of one public 
pool and threatening such employee that if he continued to enforce the 
rules as he understood them to be, he would be neutralized, crossed the 
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line from making policy for the entire State to making ad hoc decisions 
benefitting only a few. And then, by arranging the firing of an employee 
who was simply doing his job and enforcing rules the two legislators did 
not want enforced, Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart did not seek to 
benefit the public at large or even their constituents-they engaged in a 
deliberate effort to subvert enforcement of the law by eliminating the 
employee in the executive branch who was just doing his job. That is 
outside the scope of legitimate legislative activity. Legislators certainly 
have the duty to propose budget decisions. And if that was all the 
Legislative Defendants did in this case, it would have been proper for the 
trial court to grant the motion to dismiss. But Mr. Ivie alleged the 
Legislative Defendants did more than just reallocate funding priorities. 
He alleged when he disagreed with the Legislative Defendants' attempts 
to influence his performance of his executive branch functions, they 
retaliated against him and targeted this one employee for termination. In 
doing so, Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart did not seek to benefit the 
public at large, they engaged in a deliberate effort to harm one employee. 
That is not making policy for the entire state, thus, their actions were 
outside the scope of legitimate legislative activity. 
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Mr. Ivie is not challenging the right of legislators to impose 
taxes and appropriate taxpayers' funds. Mr. Ivie is not asking the Court 
to reverse the reduction of funding to the Department of Health. That is 
something the Court should not do and cannot do. That appropriation 
decision is within the legitimate legislative sphere. What Mr. Ivie is 
challenging by naming the Legislative Defendants is the legitimacy of 
Sen. Hickman's dictating to one employee of the executive branch as to 
how he ought to be doing his job (and what would happen to him if he 
did not do as Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart demanded) and after the 
Legislature passed the budget and the Executive Branch needed to figure 
out how to implement those budget cuts, Sen. Hickman's threats to the 
Department of Health that if the Executive Director did not implement 
the budget cuts in such a way as to guarantee that Mr. Ivie lost his job, 
Sen. Hickman would push for further cuts in appropriations to the 
Department of Health. Those actions are not actions making policy for 
the State of Utah but decisions targeted at one person (similar, in effect, 
to bills of attainder, prohibited in the Utah Constitution, Article I, §18, 
and see Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Community, 624 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1981) (a bill of attainder is one that imposes punishment upon an 
21 
identifiable person without judicial process)). The Legislative 
Defendants' actions fell outside of policy making and, thus, outside of 
the legislative sphere. 
Reading the Verified Complaint as the trial court should 
have read it in considering the motion to dismiss, the trial court should 
have concluded that Mr. Ivie's allegations placed the Legislative 
Defendants' actions outside the sphere of policy making for the entire 
state and beyond the scope of legitimate legislative activity. 
3. The Legislative Defendants' actions at issue were 
executive, not legislative and, thus, not entitled to legislative immunity. 
A third test of whether any given act of a legislator 
constitutes legitimate legislative activity seems to be whether the 
legislator was making laws as a legislator is charged to do or strayed over 
into enforcement of the laws, the province of the executive branch. The 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article V, Distribution of Power, 
states: 
Section 1. [Three departments of 
government.] The powers of the government of the 
State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these 
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departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the 
cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Nothing in the Utah Constitution gives members of the legislative branch 
the power to execute the laws: to make specific decisions regarding how 
one employee of the executive branch ought to do his job. 
Mr. Ivie's allegation of the Legislative Defendants' 
targeted interference in the executive department placed the actions of 
the Legislative Defendants in violation of the Utah Constitution's Article 
V, and, thus, also outside the scope of legitimate legislative action. 
The State Constitution also guarantees to employees the 
right to be free of political control. See Utah Constitution, Article XVI, 
Section 3: 
The Legislature shall prohibit: 
Section 3: the political...control of 
employees; and 
And see Article VI, Section 7: The 
Legislature, by appropriate legislation, shall provide 
for the enforcement of the provisions of this article. 
Mr. Ivie's allegations as to the Legislative Defendants' actions towards 
him read very much like political control of an employee. 
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In enacting the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, 
Utah Code, § 67-21-1, et. seq., the Legislature was acting in furtherance 
of the State Constitution's command to the Legislature to provide for the 
enforcement of laws which prohibit political control of employees. If the 
Legislature is immune from the provisions of the Utah Protection of 
Public Employees Act, which the Legislature itself passed, such 
construction would violate the very spirit and intent of the State 
Constitution requirements. 
The actions of which Mr. Ivie complains occurred outside 
of the legislative session and outside the work of any legislative 
committee. They also occurred outside of the function of making policy 
for the entire state. What Mr. Ivie is complaining about are actions by 
members of the legislative branch seeking to dictate and control (exactly 
as management would seek to control) the actions of an employee in the 
executive branch and retaliating against an employee in the executive 
branch for not following their directives and ultimatums. Those actions 
constitute trying to execute the laws (or, in this case, not execute the 
laws). This crosses the line from the legislative function to the executive 
function. See also Alexander v. Holden. 66 F.3d 62, 67 (4th Cir. 1995) 
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(lawmakers making decision to not rehire or reappoint plaintiff to a 
position that had been consolidated into another position not entitled to 
absolute immunity). See also Kamplain v. Curry County Bd. Of 
Commissioners. 159 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 1998) (local legislative officials 
who barred a plaintiff from speaking in future meetings of the board 
were carrying out an essentially executive function and, thus, not entitled 
to legislative immunity). In trying to control how Mr. Ivie did his job 
and then, because he insisted on enforcing the laws as they existed, 
retaliating against him in an indirect but very certain way, the Legislative 
Defendants sought to exercise executive power. That takes them outside 
of legitimate legislative activity. 
Once a legislator steps outside of enacting laws of general 
application for the state as a whole and into the role of telling one rank 
and file employee of one department of the executive branch how to do 
his job, not through general legislative oversight of the entire 
Department, but through specific one-on-one directives and threats, that 
legislator has stepped out of the legitimate legislative sphere into the 
executive sphere and shed himself of legislative immunity. Likewise, 
after passing a budget for the entire state government, if a legislator 
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ventures beyond determining budget priorities and appropriating tax 
dollars, and into the role of telling the management of an executive 
department to make sure budget cuts are implemented in such a way as to 
make sure that one particular employee loses his job, that legislator has 
sailed out of the safe harbor of legislative immunity and into the 
executive ocean and loses legislative immunity. See Roberson v. 
MulHns, 29 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1994) (board's decision to terminate 
Plaintiff as superintendent of public works not done in a legislative 
capacity and thus no absolute immunity). Contra see Bogan v. Scott 
Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (city officials who approved a city ordinance 
which eliminated a city employee's job entitled to absolute immunity). 
Taking the allegations of the Verified Complaint as true, as 
the trial court should have done in deciding a motion to dismiss, the trial 
court should have concluded that the Legislative Defendants strayed 
from legitimate legislative activity into executive action and lost the 
ability to cloak themselves with legislative immunity. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Nothing Mr. Ivie is asking the Court to do challenges legislative 
independence. Everything Mr. Ivie is seeking fosters the separation of powers. Mr. 
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Ivie is asking the Court to give meaning to the decision the Legislature itself made 
when it enacted a state law providing protection to state government whistleblowers in 
the executive branch and to not allow the Legislature or individual legislators to hide 
behind the cloak of legislative immunity. To exempt the Legislature from needing to 
comply with the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act law and to sanction 
a 
retaliation by the Legislature against whistleblowers would be very unfortunate 
A 
development. 
Mr. Ivie's allegations that the Legislative Defendants acted outside the 
scope of legitimate legislative activity, raised a fact question as to whether the actions 
of which Mr. Ivie was complaining fell within or outside of the sphere of legitimate 
legislative authority. The trial court should not have granted the motion to dismiss but 
should have let the case proceed. The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's 
dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM 
Trial Court's Minute Entry R. at 114-119 
i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
RONALD REX IVIE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH, SEN. JOHN WILLIAM HICKMAN 
REP. STEPHEN H. URQUHART, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 030400804 
Judge MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Tjl Before the Court is Senator John W. Hickman (Hickman) and Representative Stephen H. 
Urquhart's (Hickman and Urquhart or jointly as "Legislative Defendants") motion to dismiss 
joined by the State of Utah (Utah) and the Utah Department of Health (Department of Health or 
jointly as "Utah Defendants"). The Court GRANTS the Legislative Defendants' motion to 
dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 Hickman and Urquhart are duly elected legislators of Utah. Ronald Rex Ivie (Plaintiff) 
was employed by the Department of Health as a general sanitation and safety manager for thirteen 
years. 
P In May/June 2001, Plaintiff was assigned by his supervisor, Richard Clark (Clark), to 
conduct training exercises with the staff of the local health department and assess public pool 
sanitation and safety program in St. George and Cedar City, Utah. 
1f4 On June 7, 2001, Plaintiff submitted a written memorandum to Clark summarizing his 
training. He further provided his assessment that the health department in St. George and Cedar 
City, Utah were not enforcing State Administrative Code Rule R392-302 "Design, Construction 
and Operation of Public Pools" and was, therefore, allowing members of the public swimming 
pool to be exposed to potentially serious or life threatening health hazards. (Plaintiffs memo). 
P Subsequently, a constituent of Hickman and Urquhart complained to them that her pool 
should not be required to comply with the requirements of the State rules regulating public 
swimming pools. Thereafter, Hickman and Urquhart contacted Plaintiffs supervisors. 
1}6 Plaintiff spoke with Hickman and Urquhart about the requirements of the State rules and 
why they were necessary. Hickman and Urquhart insisted that Plaintiff exempt pools operated by 
retirement communities in St. George and Cedar City, Utah from portions of the State rules. 
Plaintiff informed them that there was no permissive language in the Rule to allow him to do that. 
Both Hickman and Urquhart told Plaintiff that if he did not comply with their wishes, they would 
deal with it in their own way with legislative action. 
fJ Subsequently, the Joint Executive Appropriations Committee of the Utah Legislature 
of which Hickman was a Vice-Chairman held a meeting. Urquhart was not present. At that 
meeting, Senator Poulton moved to reduce the Department of Health's budget by $115,700 to 
make that amount available for Medicaid breast and cervical cancer treatment. The committee 
voted and passed the motion, with all but one of the eighteen members present voting in favor of 
the motion. The reduction reflected the elimination of two full-time positions of the Department 
ofHealth. 
%% The reduction in funding to the Department ofHealth, recommended by the Executive 
Appropriations Committee, was sponsored by Senator Leonard Blackham as Senate Bill 1, 
Appropriations Act (S.B. 1). On March 5, 2002, S.B. 1 passed both houses of the Utah State 
Legislature. On March 26, 2002, Governor Michael O. Leavitt signed S.B1 into law 1 
Tf9 Executive Director of the Department ofHealth, Rod Betit, (Betit) singled out Plaintiff for 
termination because of Hickman's real or veiled threat to push for future cuts to appropriations of 
the Department ofHealth if Betit did not terminate Plaintiffs position. 
1J10 On June 25, 2002, the Department ofHealth notified Plaintiff that due to the non-
appropriation of funds from the Utah State Legislature his position was being terminated. 
Ifl 1 On July 24, 2002, Plaintiff submitted an appeal to the Department challenging his 
termination on several grounds, including the fact that he was the senior staff member and there 
were junior staff members that could be terminated instead. 
1J12 On July 25, 2002, Betit prepared and signed a workforce adjustment plan that had the 
purpose and effect of terminating Plaintiffs employment. 
If 13 On October 22, 2002, Plaintiff hand delivered a Notice of Claim to Becky Jorgenson, a 
receptionist of the Utah Attorney General's office. The Utah Attorney General's Office did not 
respond within ninety days, therefore, the claim is deemed denied. 
1
 The Court notes that these facts were not in Plaintiffs verified complaint, however, 
Defendants provided these facts in their brief in support of the motion to dismiss requesting the 
Court take judicial notice of such facts. Plaintiff did not oppose. Accordingly, the Court takes 
judicial notice of the procedural history relating to the passing of S.B.I, which is the bill that 
reduced the Department ofHealth funding by $115,700. 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
fl4 On January 21, 2003, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint alleging wrongful termination in 
violation of the United States Constitution, Utah Constitution, Utah Protection of Public 
Employees Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 etseq. (UPPEA), Department of Human Resource 
Managment Rules (DHRM) and public policy, against Defendants seeking damages that include 
lost wages, benefits, compensatory damages, punitive damages, court costs and attorney's fees. 
T|15 On April 24, 2003, Utah and the Department of Health filed their answer. 
%16 On June 30, 2003, Hickman and Urquhart filed their motion to dismiss. 
TJ17 On July 28, 2003, Plaintiff filed his opposition to Hickman and Urquhart's motion to 
dismiss. 
If 18 On August 28, 2003, Utah and the Department of Health filed their joinder in argument to 
Hickman and Urquhart's motion to dismiss. Utah and the Department of Health agreed that 
Hickman and Urquhart are immune from liability due to the Speech or Debate Clause of Article 
VI, section 8 of the Utah Constitution and furthermore, that they are not "employers" as defined 
by Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2. 
If 19 On September 2, 2003, Hickman and Urquhart filed their reply to the Plaintiffs 
opposition. That same day, Hickman and Urquhart filed a notice to submit. 
LAW 
Tf20 Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under subdivision (b)(6) admits the 
facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St. 
Benedict's Development Co., v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). A complaint 
does not fail to state a claim unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to 
no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. Liquor Control 
Commission v. Athas, 243 P.2d 441 (Utah 1952). 
\2\ In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his 
favor. Mounteerv. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
1(22 Legislative Defendants claim that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. Specifically, the Legislative Defendants claim that they are (1) immune from liability for 
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action taken as legislators, (2) not an "employer" as defined by § 67-21-2 and (3) not the cause of 
Plaintiffs injury. 
TJ23 The dispositive issue is whether the Legislative Defendants are immune from the 
underlying law suit of Plaintiff. In support of the Legislative Defendants' immunity claim, they 
argue that they are immune because (A) the Speech or Debate Clause of Article VI, Section 8, 
provides immunity from acts within the legislative sphere, (B) the issue is nonjusticiable and (C) 
common-law legislative immunity applies. 
TJ24 Article VI, Section of the Utah Constitution provides immunity "for words used in any 
speech or debate in either house, [members of the Legislature] shall not be questioned in any 
other place." See, e.g., Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128 (Utah 2002). 
TJ25 The Speech and Debate clause protection is there "to support the rights of the people, by 
enabling their representative to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, 
civil or criminal" Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951). 
TJ26 The Speech and Debate clause is read broadly. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975). "Rather than giving the clause a cramped construction, the 
Court has sought to implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive 
and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator." Gravel v. 
United State, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972). 
1J27 The inquiry is whether the activities plaintiff complains of are within the "legitimate 
legislative sphere." Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra, 421 U S at 503 
Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on 
the motive or intent of the official performing it. The privilege of absolute 
immunity would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and 
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the 
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. . . 
. [it is] not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into 
the motives of legislators. . . . This leaves us with the question of whether, 
stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioners' actions were 
legislative. 
Bogan v. Scott Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54-55 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. at 373-74. 
P 8 The Legislative Defendants argue that the acts Plaintiff complains of were within the 
legitimate legislative sphere, therefore, they are absolutely immune for those acts. Specifically, 
the Legislative Defendants argue that the actions of the Legislative Defendants were part of the 
process the Legislature goes through each year to appropriate public funds Moreover, the 
Legislative Defendants did not reallocate or determine the appropriation of public funds by 
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themselves, it was decided by the Executive Appropriations Committee, a majority of both the 
House and the Senate and final signing by the Governor. 
1J29 In opposition, the Plaintiff argues that the acts Plaintiff complains of were not taken in the 
Legislative Defendants1 capacity as legislators, but rather before and after the legislative sessions. 
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that he complains of the Legislative Defendants acts to interfere with 
his job performance by telling him what to do, for threatening to take adverse action against him if 
he did not comply with their directives, for threatening to push for further cuts in appropriations 
to the Department of Health if Betit did not implement the budget cuts in a way to terminate 
Plaintiffs job. Plaintiff argues that these acts were outside the scope of "legitimate legislative 
sphere" and absolute immunity does not apply. 
pO Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, as this Court must do on a 
motion to dismiss, the Court concludes that there are insufficient facts to show that Plaintiff has a 
claim against the Legislative Defendants. The acts underlying Plaintiffs claims were within the 
Legislative Defendants power as legislators. Plaintiff specifically named the Legislative 
Defendants in their capacities as senator and representative. Plaintiff has failed to provide any 
cases wherein a private party had a cause of action against a legislator for passing a bill that 
eliminates a position or threatens to use his legislative power if a plaintiff failed to do what the 
legislator requests. Legislative Defendants have authority to propose budget decisions. That is 
what the Legislative Defendants did here. S.B, 1 reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision 
implicating the budgetary priorities of the state of Utah. The bill involved an amount to be 
transferred from one department to another for policy reasons. Motives of legislators cannot be 
considered and, therefore, the Court cannot infer wrongful intent on the Legislative Defendants in 
their proposal Broadly applying legislative acts as being protected, the Court concludes that the 
Legislative Defendants' acts were within the legitimate legislative sphere.2 The Court concludes 
that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the Legislative 
Defendants are absolutely immune from the acts alleged by Plaintiff 
$31 The issue of immunity being dispositive, the Court need not address the remaining claims 
of the Legislative Defendants. 
2
 Moreover, the Court notes that even if the Legislative Defendants' threats were outside 
of the broad umbrella of protection, any threats made by the Legislative Defendants were more or 
less true statements of their power as legislators. Plaintiff has failed to provide a legal basis for 
how these threats are actionable. The only plausible cause of action that this Court can conceive 
is a § 1983 claim. However, even there, the Legislative Defendants are protected. Bogan v. Scott 
Harris, supra, 523 U.S. 44. 
-5-
ft?2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Legislative Defendants1 motion to dismiss. 
# So ordered this ^ day of September 2003. 
MICHAEL K. BURTON^ 
Third District Court Judge 
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Attorneys for defendants Senator John William Hickman and Representative Stephen H. Urquhart 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD REX IVJJE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SEN. 
JOHN WILLIAM HICKMAN, REP. 
STEPHEN H. URQUHART, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING LEGISLATIVE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 030400804 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
On June 30,2003, defendants Senator John W. Hickman and Representative Stephen H. 
Urquhart ("legislative defendants") filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs verified complaint. On 
September 23,2003, the court, having considered the legislative defendants' motion and the arguments 
of counsel for all parties, issued a minute entry dated September 23, 2003. Pursuant to the court's ruling 
in the minute entry that the legislative defendants are absolutely immune from suit for the claims 
•issertH by plaintiff, the court heieby aiders that plaintiffs verified complaint against the legist Hi w 
defendants be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice and un the merits. 
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I In, icby ccr mat on the <Z\ day of September, 2003, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
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